November 2026
Path toward Peaceful Coexistence between Thailand and Cambodia:
A Practical Strategy for Normalization
Supalak Ganjanakhundee
Supalak Ganjanakhundee
Executive Summary
The armed conflicts between Thailand and Cambodia in 2025 damaged bilateral relations, disputed border economies, and inflicted severe losses on soldiers, civilians, and border communities. Ceasefire arrangements supported by ASEAN, China, and the United States reduced immediate hostilities but have yet to establish peaceful coexistence. Existing bilateral and international mechanisms provide avenues for cooperation and dispute settlement. The central obstacle is the limited political willingness to use them consistently and authorize adjustments that would restore civilian life while negotiations continue.
The impasse reflects several connected problems. Military authority over border governance allows operational assessments to shape decisions concerning civilian movement, land access, and diplomatic engagement. Unilateral physical and administrative changes in contested areas can entrench control and raise the political costs of accommodation. Nationalist mobilization, institutional prestige and leadership credibility can reward firmness, while adjusting the approach is politically dangerous. These incentives differ between the two countries and require separate assessments.
Civilian leadership also bears responsibility. Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul’s statement on October 31, 2026 linked continued border closure to unsolved territorial disputes, transnational crimes, and security concerns, demonstrating that restrictions are endorsed at the political level, aligning with military-dominant border governance. Linking several issues risks making normalization dependent on their collective resolution. Meanwhile, economic losses do not automatically generate effective pressure for reopening. The ISP border survey indicates that hardship coexists with security concerns, mistrust, and differing local preferences. National economic indicators cannot establish whether affected communities have recovered or whether closure produces benefits exceeding its costs.
Thailand and Cambodia employ different approaches to the disputes. Bangkok resorts to military might, territorial control, and border restrictions, while Phnom Penh prefers international mechanisms and international law, both profess respect for international law and seek external support. They do not need to adopt identical strategies to cooperate. Normalization, peaceful coexistence, and boundary settlement require connected but distinct decisions. Diplomatic restoration, civilian recovery, and carefully managed border reopening can proceed while territorial claims remain unresolved. Five practical recommendations follow.
1. Establish political direction through quiet diplomacy. Each government should designate a trusted envoy with direct access to its leadership and accepted by the other side. Serving or retired military officers with diplomatic judgment could help secure armed forces’ cooperation, given their central role in the conflicts. The envoys must report directly to civilian leadership and operate under explicit government mandates. Their task is to explore policy adjustments, identify reciprocal measures, and obtain authorization for implementation. In Thailand, a prime minister-led interagency committee should coordinate decisions, resolve institutional objections, and assign responsibilities. Cambodia should designate an equivalent arrangement suited to its institutions.
2. Prevent renewed armed conflict and unilateral changes in contested areas. The civilian government should instruct defense ministries to suspend unilateral activities altering the physical conditions or administrative use of contested areas. The General Border Committee (GBC) and Regional Border Committee (RBC) should implement practices of restraint, hotlines, and incident response procedures. Military leaders should avoid escalatory rhetoric and unverified public allegations. Temporary security arrangements must preserve legal claims. ASEAN observation can support verification where access and reporting arrangements permit, but must not become a publicity exercise or an instrument for validating competing accusations.
3. Restore civilian life and undertake phased border reopening. Recovery must reflect differing local conditions. Thai communities require attention to outstanding repairs, lost incomes and restricted access; displaced Cambodian communities require assistance and conditions supporting safe, voluntary and dignified return. Humanitarian access and essential healthcare should be provided according to need, without implying territorial recognition. Thai public and private healthcare providers should communicate clearly about humanitarian services. Phased reopening should begin with paired crossings in lower-tension areas, with announced operating hours, eligible movements, safeguards, and review criteria developed through local consultation.
Implementation periods should run from the adoption of this strategic proposal:
Within three months:
- Appoint ‘trusted’ envoys and civilian coordinators
- Establish interagency oversight
- Initial consultations
- Activate hotlines
- Convene the JBC; schedule GBC and continue regular RBC meetings
- Assess civilian needs
- Prepare reopening pilots for border crossing and diplomatic restoration
Three to six months:
- Implement approved restraint and reopening arrangement
- Return of senior diplomatic representatives
- Sustain recovery assistance
- Maintain negotiation
- Assess progress and report to respective governments
Six to twelve months:
- Evaluate and expand successful arrangements
- Address excluded communities
- Review agency performance and resources
- Sustain official response to Track II and local proposals
After twelve months:
- Embed effective procedures in routine bilateral relations and maintain negotiations toward accepted boundary outcomes
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